

NOVEMBER 1952

ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST

Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army

A Soldier's Business Is Combat

Hurricane Hunters

"His Faithful Dog . . ."

Schoolboys Go to Camp

Academy for Leadership

The Second Year in Korea

Soldier Voting—Then and Now

Public Information Supports a Mission



ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST



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In This Issue:



THE INDISPENSABLE INFANTRY. Headline readers entranced by stories of startling new weapons are apt to minimize the infantryman's role in the atomic era. Yet as General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declares, "There will always be a need for sufficient ground strength to force the enemy to concentrate for attack. If an enemy wanted to disperse his forces so that soldiers walked one hundred yards apart they could advance in the face of the greatest atomic power on earth—unless other men were there to stop them."

Making certain that our soldiers are physically and mentally prepared for the tough infighting required to stop an aggressor in his tracks is the job of Army Field Forces. In "A Soldier's Business Is Combat," General John R. Hodge, Chief of Army Field Forces, describes the molding of a typical young recruit into an efficient fighter.

TOMORROW'S HISTORY TODAY. Another installment—the fifth—in the Korean chronicle of front-line action and truce negotiations summarizes the January to June 1952 period in "The Second Year in Korea."

KEY CONSULTANTS. "Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army" tells how outstanding professional and civic leaders across the Nation are helping the Army solve a variety of problems.

RIDERS OF THE STORM. The Carib Indians call them *hurakans*; on Okinawa and Wake Island they are known as typhoons; Australians speak of them as willy-willies. But whatever the terminology, the fact remains that a hurricane is a violent wind of devastating intensity.

Into these atmospheric maelstroms, Navy reconnaissance crews fly in quest of meteorological data. Some of the thrills and risks encountered are described in "Hurricane Hunters."

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U. S. Army Photograph

GENERAL JOHN R. HODGE

CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES

A SOLDIER'S BUSINESS IS COMBAT

GENERAL JOHN R. HODGE

COMBAT, both in World War II and in Korea, has taught certain principles of warfare which must be applied to everyday training. These lessons are being learned by all new soldiers so they may go into any future conflict both physically and mentally prepared to do a tough, dirty job.

In the early days of Korean fighting one outstanding lesson was learned—every man must be trained to fight as an infantryman first, then to perform as a specialist in his respective branch. There were, and are today, in Korea daily instances where men in all units in the combat zone have been called upon to defend their positions against infiltration and guerrilla attacks. Korean ground fighting today consists mostly of small unit actions, night patrols and squad actions, where every man may be called upon to fight as an infantryman if necessary.

Repeated incidents in World War II also pointed up the value of infantry training for all soldiers. On many occasions, men other than infantrymen were called up to fight on the front lines when infantrymen were not available. Today, one of the first things the new soldier learns is that he must be primarily a fighting man, ready at any time to enter combat. His later training, even at advanced levels, will be based on that fundamental principle.

When Private Joe Smith, a typical citizen-soldier, is inducted he is sent to one of the ten training divisions in the continental United States, all of which conduct training under the direction and supervision of the Chief of Army Field Forces.* Upon arrival, he is permitted to sew on the division shoulder patch—

*The ten training divisions are: 101st Airborne, Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky; 5th Infantry, Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; 6th Infantry, Fort Ord, California; 8th Infantry, Fort Jackson, South Carolina; 9th Infantry, Fort Dix, New Jersey; 10th Infantry, Fort Riley, Kansas; 3d Armored, Fort Knox, Kentucky; 5th Armored, Camp Chaffee, Arkansas; 6th Armored, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; 7th Armored, Camp Roberts, California.

the patch worn by an outstanding combat unit in World War II—and he begins eight weeks of individual basic, to be followed by a similar period of specialized training.

Early in his career he is made aware of the proud combat record of his unit. Perhaps the division to which Smith is assigned is the 3d Armored which, as a combat division in World War II, spearheaded the First Army's attack through Normandy, Northern France, the Rhineland, Ardennes and Central Europe. Or perhaps he is assigned to one of the other training divisions, all of which gained World War II fame. This pride in unit brings with it a sense of belonging and it heightens morale.

Other recruits may be sent to a replacement training center for individual training prior to assignment to fill vacancies in tactical units in the United States or overseas. Thirteen replacement centers also give specialized instruction in administrative and technical services of the Army and combat arms other than Infantry.

As another possibility the newly enlisted trainee may be assigned to a recently activated unit of the Reserve or National Guard. Such units have a cadre of experienced officers and noncommissioned officers who put the recruits through a training cycle the same as that given in training divisions and replacement training centers.

Private Smith is first slated for eight weeks of basic combat training, which will teach him not only what to do and how to do it but also will explain why he is in the Army. In weekly Command Conferences he is given background information on world conditions underlying the chain of circumstances which brought him into the Army. He quickly realizes that, in addition to being a fighter for his country, he may also be called on to be a representative of his nation on foreign soil.

He is reminded that our men in Europe are doing more than serving as occupation and defensive troops. Each soldier is a personal diplomat to the country in which he is serving. His actions are weighed pro and con by those with whom he serves and by the civilian population of the European nations. Such is also the case of our fighting men in Korea.

The primary purpose of basic training, however, is the professional preparation of the soldier for combat. Private Smith finds that he must be in top physical condition to meet the rigorous training schedule. Infantry combat, the most demanding occupation on earth, presupposes that a man in good

physical condition has the best chance of survival. For at least two weeks, trainees live in pup tents and train in the open, regardless of weather. The recruit finds that living in the field presents many problems not ordinarily faced in garrison; he is taught how to take care of wounds by self-administered first aid treatment; he practices field sanitation, including purification of drinking water which may be contaminated.



Soldiers on the Infiltration Course advance under machine gun fire. Detonations simulate artillery bursts.

U. S. Army Photograph

The combined effects of cross-country and speed marches, field training and the Confidence Course develop the soldier physically and enhance his self-assurance. On the Confidence Course, inclined walls, rope swings, logs laid over ditches, and other ingeniously designed barriers test his physical mettle and develop stamina in surmounting obstacles. Hazardous falls and dangerous jumps are protected by deep sawdust or sand pits but the going is rigorous nonetheless. Competitive spirit is encouraged as he strives to surpass his companions in feats of physical prowess. Steadily he is transformed into a physically hardened fighting man, ready to withstand the tension and exhaustion of long hours of sustained action.

Recruits master the operation and employment of the M1 rifle and bayonet, carbine, machine gun, bazooka and grenade and they fire all of these weapons under the supervision of

competent, battle-trained instructors. Once he learns the capabilities and limitations of his rifle, Smith comes to regard it as the instrument of his own personal preservation as well as the tool which is vital to the success of his mission. He carries his rifle wherever he goes in the field and to the classroom.

Smith also learns the use and detection of mines and booby traps; he receives a practical demonstration of the manner in which they are employed by a resourceful foe in thwarting his advance. He places antitank and antipersonnel mines in defensive patterns to slow the forward movement of an enemy and learns how to make map overlays of mined areas.

The regularity with which the enemy is employing mines in Korea makes it imperative that all soldiers be trained in mine detection. Since engineers are not always readily available, our troops accompanying tanks, for example, must be able to detect the presence of mines and remove them. In fact, the tank crews themselves are often called upon to detect and clear minefields which they encounter.

The recruit learns how to read a map and a compass; as a test of his ability, he is required to negotiate a compass course to a predetermined point in the woods, or back to camp. This skill may well save his life if he is separated from his unit and finds himself behind enemy lines during a night infiltration.

More than one third of all tactical training is conducted during the hours of darkness. Much stress is placed on night firing, night vision, battlefield illumination and night movements. Upon completing night training, Smith finds that he has no fear of darkness; rather he learns to use it as a valuable ally.

Private Smith is briefed on the proper identification of both friendly and hostile aircraft, with special attention to the most modern types encountered in Korea. He is trained in effective counter-measures against low-flying enemy aircraft on strafing missions. He learns the defensive measures to be taken against tank attack, and is given a graphic demonstration of their effectiveness when he remains unharmed as a thundering tank rolls over his foxhole.

He is also shown how tanks may be used for evacuation of wounded. In Korea on numerous occasions when our wounded were pinned down by murderous enemy fire and medical aid men were unable to reach them, tanks were used to protect the wounded by straddling them. The wounded were then able to crawl into the tanks by way of the underside hatch.

Smith gets considerable tactical experience. On mock patrols

he practices squad tactics and combat firing. He becomes familiar with the art of cover and concealment and the utilization of camouflage techniques. Veterans of Korean action show him many ingenious methods used by Chinese Communists in concealing firing positions and installations and thus he learns indirectly from the enemy.

Trainee Smith is rapidly becoming a soldier in fact as well as in name. In the latter stages of basic training he undergoes a series of realistic exercises known as Battle Indoctrination Courses. These courses consist of the Infiltration and Close Combat Courses and in addition, for the majority of combat arms personnel, the Combat-in-Cities and the Attack Courses. All are designed to show Smith how a battlefield looks, sounds, smells and feels so that when he gets into combat he will react with a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of shock.

The Infiltration Course accustoms the soldier to hostile machine gun and artillery fire. It also teaches him to move over ground without exposing his body. Private Smith enters the course from a trench and crawls flat on the ground for approximately seventy-five yards, under barbed wire entanglements and other obstacles, while machine gun fire rattles at a safe distance over his head. Explosives are detonated near him to simulate enemy artillery fire; he must keep his head down, hold his rifle out of the dirt and continue steadily forward until he reaches a trench at the end of the course. Here he fixes his bayonet and, together with other members of his squad, assaults his objective. He is required to run this course once during daylight and once in darkness, rain or shine.

In the Close Combat Course, Private Smith fires his rifle rapidly at surprise targets while negotiating broken terrain. He advances toward an objective one hundred to two hundred yards distant, firing live ammunition at targets of opportunity—man-sized silhouettes which pop up before him at irregular intervals and in unexpected places. During his advance, Smith crosses and surmounts natural and man-made obstacles, keeping always on the alert to spot the fleeting targets.

The Combat-in-Cities Course gives Private Smith practice in teamwork required in fighting through streets and alleys of urban areas. He uses live rifle ammunition and practice grenades while advancing cautiously through a model village. He learns how to move among the mock buildings and cover the other men of his unit in a house-to-house advance. Amid the noise and confusion of battle he enters and clears houses

theoretically occupied by the enemy, meanwhile scaling walls, jumping from roofs and avoiding booby traps placed to surprise the unwary. He thus learns the close co-ordination required in advancing through towns which may bar his route.

In the Attack Course, Smith's company moves to the jump-off point for an attack just as an air strike hits the target area directly in his front. A live artillery and mortar barrage smashes "enemy" positions as Smith's platoon, among others, moves out for the attack. Tanks, bazookas, recoilless rifles, machine guns and other supporting weapons add their fire power to that of the riflemen in his platoon, which is now engaged with the enemy. Private Smith is in the thick of a full-scale "battle," one which not only accustoms him to battlefield conditions but instills in him confidence in his supporting weapons, tanks, artillery and close air support.

His platoon takes its objective; the supporting fire shifts to knock out the enemy as he prepares for a counterattack. Men of the platoon dig in and establish a defensive position. The problem ends after the counterattack is repulsed.

This type of training is paying big dividends in Korea. From the very beginning of that conflict the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces has sent observer teams to the Far East



Members of a patrol are caught off guard and "captured" by Aggressor infantrymen during field maneuvers.

U. S. Army Photograph

Command to study the effectiveness of our training program. And from the very first, our doctrines and training policies have been proven sound and adaptable to changing conditions.

Through constant supervision and inspection, Army Field Forces insures that quality of instruction and training facilities shall meet the highest standards. Training Aid Centers provide scale models and schematic diagrams to illustrate functioning and operation of complicated mechanisms. Training films prepared under Army Field Forces supervision for Army-wide distribution together with other training aids help materially in cutting training time to a fraction of its former length.

The officers and noncommissioned officers whom Private Smith meets every day as instructors are experts in their fields; many are veterans of World War II and Korean action. Most units now make this fund of experience more widely available by organizing their instruction under the division faculty system. By this method a training pool is formed of instructor specialists who concentrate on one or two subjects and are thus able to give more comprehensive coverage of their particular fields. (See "Faculty System for Combat Training," September 1952 DIGEST.)

Private Smith continued in his unit, an infantry training division, for a second eight weeks of specialized infantry instruction. In the first phase, Smith received individual instruction in basic infantry tactics and weapons and practiced teamwork within small units such as a squad. In the second phase, his training is more specialized. He is trained to function as a member of a platoon and learns to work in co-ordination with tanks, artillery concentrations and air strikes which may be brought to bear in supporting the advance of his platoon. If he has the proper background, he may be sent to clerks, automotive mechanics, or radio operators, or other specialist schools within that division during his second eight weeks.

Others who complete basic infantry training may be sent to divisions organized for artillery, armor and combat engineer instruction where they become skilled in one of the other arms also. Still others may be sent for specialist training to a technical service school. But regardless of the type of specialization, every soldier is basically trained as an infantryman.

Of the ten training divisions now organized, eight give the complete sixteen-week infantry training cycle. One of these, the 3d Armored Division, also gives instruction in armor to trainees assigned to that branch. The remaining two, the 5th

Armored and 6th Armored Divisions, give artillery and engineer training respectively.

At the completion of sixteen weeks of training, Private Smith normally would go overseas from a training division or replacement training center. However, there are a number of other assignments he might fill. He might be assigned to one of the Reserve or National Guard units on active duty, or to a Regular Army unit for further training. As such he would receive basic and advanced *unit* training in a specified job and may eventually go overseas with that unit.

Basic and advanced *unit* training differs from the sixteen-week *individual* training cycle in that Private Smith becomes a designated team member of a unit, with an assigned job. In basic training, Smith learns all operations of, for instance, a rifle squad as a possible replacement for any position. In unit training he may be a BAR man with a specified job, learning the relation of his particular job to that of the rest of the platoon and the company. If he finally goes overseas with the unit, he is assigned as a BAR man with the squad, platoon and company with which he completed unit training.

Should he elect, and if he is mentally and physically qualified, he may at the end of his first sixteen weeks in the Army go to Leadership School or into airborne or Ranger training. All these courses are open to men assigned to units as well.

If Private Smith meets the necessary physical and mental qualifications, he may apply for Officer Candidate School and further develop his potential leadership abilities. To qualify for a commission as a second lieutenant he must complete his sixteen-week individual training and then pursue twenty-two weeks of OCS instruction. He then must serve at least eighteen additional months on active duty.

A modern army demands innumerable specialists, and many schools are maintained to provide a steady flow of qualified personnel. They teach widely varying occupations, ranging from cooking and baking to electronics and deep sea diving. Most specialized training is on the basis of Army-wide personnel requirements of various branches.

Smith finds that he will not be eligible for some specialist schools until he has completed his full sixteen-week basic cycle and has joined a unit. Once he is assigned to a unit and becomes a noncommissioned officer, his chances of getting special schooling in his career field are greatly enhanced.

Assignments to the paratroops or to other hazardous duty

is on a voluntary basis, promoting a special *esprit de corps* in such units. One of the special missions Private Smith can undertake voluntarily is Ranger type training. Although the use of separate Ranger companies has been discontinued, he may volunteer for this duty with his own unit. If he is in top-flight physical condition and is accepted, he will undergo eight weeks of intensive training at Fort Benning, Georgia. There he learns how to survive in the jungle, how to take care of himself in hand-to-hand combat, how to cross rivers in small boats and on rope bridges, how to scale mountain cliffs and how to make successful raids behind enemy lines. After completing this gruelling course, Smith can proudly wear the shoulder arc of the Rangers.

The maneuver is the culminating test of Smith's individual, unit and specialized training. Besides being a testing ground for Private Smith and thousands of others like him, the maneuver provides unit staff officers and commanders at all levels an opportunity to improve techniques of command, administration, intelligence, tactics and supply. Maneuvers also serve as a medium for trying out equipment, organizational concepts and tactical doctrines. Largely as a result of maneuver experience, backed by lessons learned in combat, the Army continually strengthens its operational procedures. All these improvements eventually affect Private Smith directly or indirectly.

A maneuver may be conducted under conventional conditions of weather and terrain—or it may be designed to train and test men and material in arctic, desert, mountain, amphibious, airborne or jungle operations. Through a carefully planned series of field exercises, the Army thus gains practical experience within a wide range of simulated conditions approximating those which may be faced in any war of the future.

Some maneuvers are designed to test a specific strategic or tactical concept—establishment of an airhead as in Exercise Swarmer in 1950, or the field operation of a logistical command as in Exercise Southern Pine in 1951. More recently in Exercise Desert Rock IV, troops in foxholes observed at first hand the effects of the atomic bomb when used as a tactical weapon in the field.

When Private Smith moves out with his unit on maneuvers, he discovers that the traditional "red" and "blue" armies with their array of umpires marking out simulated artillery concentrations and assessing simulated casualties are a thing of the past. Instead, his division and the other units are pitted

against a resourceful Aggressor Force which acts as a live opponent. Aggressor troops have their own distinctive uniform, organization and tactics and are thoroughly trained in the methods and techniques of the hypothetical enemy they represent. Private Smith, for example, might be captured by an officer of the Aggressor Force and questioned at length on the size and disposition of his unit. Were he to divulge this information, his unit could expect a punishing raid.

Aggressor is a well-organized force, experienced in throwing obstacles into the path of the friendly force's advance. This mock enemy frequently takes the offensive in an unorthodox but well-developed plan of attack. Smith and his unit must keep constantly on the alert to avoid surprise.

Maneuvers enable Army units down to the battalion level to gain proficiency in air-ground operations and co-ordination of close air support. Here the Army-Air Force team is welded into an effective weapon; unit commanders become familiar with capabilities and limitations of tactical air support; and every soldier from private on up learns to appreciate the devastating power of the air arm linked with the Infantry-Tank-Artillery team in combat.

In training maneuvers, the Army attempts to instil in all branches of the service a clearer conception of each other's capabilities and limitations. This, in turn, produces a better, all-around fighting team. Mistakes and misunderstandings on the battlefield are too costly in human lives and equipment to be repeated. They can and must be corrected and the only place to do that is in training.

Days, weeks and months of intensive, realistic training are pointed toward a single objective—overwhelming effectiveness on the testing ground of battle. In the mission of taking and holding ground, there is no known substitute for the infantryman of courageous heart, advancing in aggressive unison with air, tank and artillery support, to close with and destroy the enemy. Wherever the American infantryman advances, freedom's dominion is expanded and the way is cleared for future generations to walk the earth in abiding peace.

CIVILIAN AIDES TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS J. CLEARY, JR.

A LONG-DORMANT Army installation is activated, bringing to a community an influx of troops, their wives and dependents to aggravate an existing housing shortage. An employer refuses to grant employees who are members of the Organized Reserve Corps leave to engage in summer training. An Army unit is transferred, leaving an economic vacuum in the neighboring community. All of these problems, and many more, are being eased by the smooth functioning efforts of Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army.

Strategically located in all the forty-eight states, the Aides serve as the eyes, ears and conscience of the Secretary of the Army, keeping him informed on developments both detrimental and beneficial to the Army's welfare. Their work may involve an exploratory visit to an Army installation, a conference with civic leaders in neighboring communities, perhaps merely a telephone call to the manager of a local industry—yet the results these Aides are producing are out of all proportion to their numbers. A measure of their success is the fact that few people know of their work, yet countless service personnel and civilians are constantly benefiting from their activity.

In private life, the Aides are leaders and authorities in their communities and in their respective fields. Some are nationally renowned engineers, bankers, attorneys, scientists, editors, industrialists, surgeons and educators. Most of them have a military background of their own and are, therefore, acutely conscious of the problems of the local commander as well as those of the local municipal officials, business or professional men and just ordinary citizens. Together they constitute a representative cross-section of community leaders across the Nation.

By their participation in Army affairs, the Aides are fulfilling

LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS J. CLEARY, Jr., General Staff, is Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army.

a primary obligation of citizenship. The American system of government traditionally emphasizes the supremacy of civilian authority over the military. But it is also true that civilian authority has its responsibilities as well as its prerogatives. One of these responsibilities is a continuing interest by civilians in Armed Forces problems and needs so that the way may be cleared for unhampered concentration on the Nation's defense. Civilian Aides give practical expression to that interest.

Typical is the project recently undertaken by Civilian Aides—an appraisal, requested by Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., of the effectiveness of the Army's Cost Consciousness campaign. While several reports had been received from military sources, Secretary Pace wanted the civilian viewpoint as well. Accordingly he asked certain Aides to visit nearby Army installations and furnish him an objective estimate of the efforts to effect economies, reduce waste and increase output.

The replies from a wide range of professional, technical and administrative experts were highly encouraging, reflecting not only their versatility but their objectivity as well. The Civilian Aides found that cost-consciousness was becoming a prominent part of the Army trainee's frame of mind. Posters, signs, directives and every type of reminder keep the subject uppermost, one Civilian Aide reported. Even on the firing range a 75-mm. shell is marked, "This cost you \$23.05. Make it count." He found that each trainee devotes ten hours to training in Cost Consciousness. Military and civilian personnel are encouraged to offer suggestions which are given careful study and, acceptable or not, are acknowledged by the commanding general.

Another Civilian Aide discovered a unique experimental unit aimed at maximum utilization of available manpower. Known as Q Company, the unit is made up of troops whose mental and physical limitations are sufficient to prevent combat training but not sufficient to warrant discharge. The men are being utilized most effectively in housekeeping and other vital jobs through a painstaking classification, assignment and training program. "At other installations," the Aide observed, "these same men might be scattered throughout regular units, becoming administrative burdens and creating training lags, whereas in Q Company they are molded into valuable assets and contribute their full share toward carrying the load."

At most installations it was found that the training programs emphasize not only the cost of replacement of items but the time loss as well. Men are told that even though they may pay

for a lost or damaged item, their money does not replace it instantly. Someone must sacrifice by doing without that piece of equipment until the money has been converted into manpower, materials, procurement orders and the like, and the finished product finally arrives from factory or warehouse.

Not all the findings were commendatory. Some Civilian Aides noted a disproportionate turnover of personnel—a by-product of Army expansion and troop rotation policies—which retarded the efficient utilization of manpower. A recommendation was advanced that certain key assignments should be made stabilized tours of duty for set periods of time.

“Operating a large training camp is indeed big business and, like big business, it cannot be operated efficiently with constant changes being made in the board of directors, supervisors and key specialists,” one Civilian Aide wrote. “It is my recommendation that personnel chiefs of the Army get together with the commanders of such key installations with a view toward earmarking a minimum number of key positions as stabilized tours of duty. But such positions should be held to an absolute minimum in order not to destroy the effectiveness of the Army-wide rotation policy.”

All in all, the same Aide found, probably the most important effect of the Cost Consciousness Program is the educational processing which the individual soldier undergoes, and the understanding he acquires, of the Army’s honest attempt to serve the public at the least possible cost by eliminating waste.

Discrimination against Reservists in civilian employment was the subject of another searching inquiry. In a letter to his Civilian Aides, Secretary Pace described the problem. “In some instances, members of the Reserve have been refused employment and denied promotion and placement to responsible positions because of their Reserve status.”

Still another source of concern to the Army Establishment, he declared, was the reluctance of some employers to release Reservists for fifteen-day training periods during the summer months. “In accepting the duty of Reserve service, individual Reservists are making not only a patriotic contribution to the defense of the Nation but in terms of time and loss of income are often making a personal sacrifice,” the Secretary wrote. “It is essential that industry, in its advocacy of this system, cooperate in this effort. Those industries which discriminate against such Reservists evade this obligation and in effect are penalizing individuals for patriotism.”

With their appreciation of both sides of the problem, the Civilian Aides were able to consider the situation in a realistic light. Their recommendations formed the basis for a new departmental approach to the problem which has paid quick dividends. As a result, the incidence of employer discrimination this year showed a sharp decline.

Sometimes the problem has been handled on a man to man basis by the Civilian Aide acting on his own initiative. One morning an Aide received word that a local firm was refusing to grant leaves of absence to its Reservist employees who were required to attend summer camp. A telephone call to the executive vice president of the company resulted not only in a reversal of the company's position, but the firm decided to make up any differential between service and company pay.

Specific problems are often similarly resolved by Civilian Aides at the local level. As an example, the Army had long been seeking to forestall the building of a large commercial enterprise just outside one of the National Cemeteries. For a time it appeared that the public might awake to find a cluster of supermarkets at the entrance to one of its national shrines. Apprised of the problem, a Civilian Aide quickly interceded with municipal authorities and dissuaded the backers from proceeding with the project.

Recently, when Secretary Pace wrote to his Civilian Aides and expressed the hope that local communities would demonstrate their appreciation to men returning from Korean duty, the Civilian Aides expanded this idea into organized civic efforts. In many cases, the veteran upon his return home is given a reception and a certificate of appreciation and is offered assistance in finding a job or furthering his education.

Although the organization and structure of the Civilian Aide system has lately been given new form and direction, actually the program has its roots in the Plattsburg movement of pre-World War I days. In 1916 a group of civilians with an eye to the troubled future formed the Military Training Camps Association of the United States, its roster of charter members including such distinguished leaders as Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., Elihu Root and Robert P. Patterson. Upon declaration of war with Germany in 1917, the Association co-operated with the War Department by recruiting volunteers for attendance at the first Officers' Training Camps. The "Plattsburg Camps" turned out many of the thousands of young officers who formed the bone and sinew of the American Expeditionary Forces.

Following World War I the Secretary of War, John W. Weeks, formally recognized the Association as a "civilian agency co-operating with the War Department in fostering the voluntary military training of civilians" and authorized appointment of one Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War for each state. The Civilian Aides, selected from the ranks of the Association, had the mission of promoting co-operation between the Association and the War Department.

In 1921 the Association sponsored inclusion of authorization for Citizens Military Training Camps (CMTc) in the National Defense Act of that year and helped secure the necessary appropriations for twelve camps accommodating ten thousand young men. During the period 1922-1940, six hundred and twenty-five thousand young men were training at CMTc. Many completed the four years of summer training and received commissions in the Organized Reserve Corps. This reservoir of trained officer personnel later proved invaluable in the all-out mobilization of World War II.

In 1940 the Army took over all training activities and initiated the system of Officer Candidate Schools. The Citizens Military Training Camps were suspended but when the question of disbanding the Association was raised, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson decided to continue that organization and the system of civilian aides for use in event of war.

During World War II Civilian Aides were called upon to perform highly important and often confidential missions for the Secretary of War. Because of their strategic geographic location, they were especially helpful in locating civilians possessing scarce and critical technical abilities for consideration for direct commissions. In the post-war period, they took the lead in advocating the build-up of a sufficiently large reservoir of trained personnel to meet any emergency.

Shortly after he assumed office in April 1950, Secretary Pace recognized the need for a system of civilian liaison with grass roots opinion throughout the country, particularly in such fields as education, public information, recruiting and Reserve activities where there are mutual Army-civilian interests. The existing system of Civilian Aides was used as a nucleus for a new organization. The former procedure of appointing Aides solely from among the MTCA membership was modified. Two-year instead of four-year terms were instituted for Aides, and selection was broadened to include other prominent civilians recommended by members of the Army

Secretariat, the Army General Staff and Army Commanders. A wider cross-section was thus obtained, representing virtually all fields in which Army policies impinge upon civilian life.

Secretary Pace then directed the Army General Staff to recommend projects in which Civilian Aides could be utilized. The General Staff proposed that their special abilities be used to resolve any problems of Army-civilian friction that might arise.

In January 1951 the Secretary wrote to the Army Commanders advising them of the new objectives of the Civilian Aide program and recommending that these key civilians be integrated as much as possible into the Army "family."

Increasingly, commanders are following Secretary Pace's lead; many are turning to Civilian Aides and local Army Advisory Committees for advice on the possible repercussions of contemplated programs and activities. Based on such forecasts, commanders are frequently able to avoid disquieting situations or at least to mitigate their impact on the community.

As an example, the call of a National Guard division into the active military service and its assignment to an installation, perhaps long vacant, has effects on the life of adjacent communities which are hard to calculate and sometimes difficult or impossible to foresee. Without proper co-ordination and planning, rents will soar, transportation facilities will suddenly become overburdened and existing educational, recreational and social service agencies will be hard pressed to cope with an influx of military personnel and their families. In such cases, the advice and co-operation of Civilian Aides and Army Advisory Committees are of immense value in staving off chaotic conditions which might otherwise result.

The Department of the Army has found that consultation with Civilian Aides and advisers is more than just an eminently practical way of solving immediate problems; the benefits are long range. Such military and civilian co-operation provides the public with a greater voice in the daily operations of the Army; it engenders within the Army a greater appreciation of civilian needs and viewpoints; and at the same time it provides the Army with a number of highly qualified civilian spokesmen who are able to interpret for the public the reasons for Army policies and practices. Both the civilian population and the Army are profiting thereby—especially in the growth of understanding and co-operation toward the common goal of security for the Nation.

THE SECOND YEAR IN KOREA

JANUARY TO JUNE 1952

STALEMATE at Panmunjom, paralyzing air strikes and limited ground action headlined the news from Korea as the conflict moved through the first six months of 1952 and into the third year of hostilities. After-action reports and newsreel coverage of two years of fighting and one year of peace talks helped swell the archives of this most thoroughly reported war in modern history.

A seven-foot stack of papers made up the historical record of the truce talks at Panmunjom. But as delegates on 10 July 1952 marked the first anniversary of the talks with a forty minute secret session, the dove of peace was proving a tough bird to catch. The length of the meetings had become so short during the early months of the year that they had to be timed with a stop-watch. The session on 14 April 1952 set a brevity record of sorts—fifteen seconds.

The delegates had come a long way in a year of negotiations. Tentative agreements had been reached on all terms of the armistice except one—the exchange of war captives. But after three hundred hours of debate on prisoner exchange, the issue was still deadlocked.

While peace talks were stalled at Panmunjom, United Nations air power spoke a language the Communists understand—the language of force. On 23 June 1952 more than five hundred Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force planes blacked out 90 percent of North Korea's power potential in raids on hydroelectric plants. In July another raid smashed the Red supply

This article, a continuation of DIGEST commentaries on military operations in the Korean campaign, was compiled by Public Information Officers of Eighth Army and Far East Command. Major Louis A. Breault, Eighth Army Press Briefing Officer, Captain William E. Cleghorn, Chief, News Division, Eighth Army and Major James H. Tate, Deputy Chief, News Division, in the Public Information Office, Far East Command, prepared this material to carry on the chronology of the series appearing in the March, August and November 1951 and April 1952 issues of ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST.

center at Pyongyang, and a flight of fifty-eight Air Force jets from the United States to Japan promised heavier raids to come.

The Navy maintained "normal" operations, effectively blocking the sea lanes around Korea and at the same time keeping installations and railroads on both coasts under bombardment and air strikes. Meanwhile the limited ground action that characterized the Korean campaign in the fall of 1951 continued into the first half of 1952 except for an increased tempo of activity in the Chorwon sector beginning in mid-June.

Ground Operations

A barrage of United Nations artillery fire along the front marked the first hours of 1952. Action in January followed the pattern of relatively minor engagements on narrow fronts or at isolated positions along a line that did not change materially.

Troops of the Republic of Korea 1st Division fought through the first half of January to recapture outpost positions taken by the enemy in a battalion attack on 28 December. But the Reds held and the familiar pattern continued—patrol contacts, enemy probes, an occasional United Nations raid to capture prisoners or destroy enemy fortifications, sometimes an enemy attack designed to accomplish the same purpose.

Occasionally the enemy came out in greater than company strength, as he did on 12 February west of the Mundung-ni valley. Then some four hundred enemy troops attacked, only to be thrown back with more than a hundred casualties. Two days later two more Red companies met the same fate.

Superior fire power, better laid artillery and mortar fire took their toll whenever the enemy ventured out in numbers. There was little give and take in real estate, but the casualty figures indicated that the Eighth Army, with its allies, was punishing the enemy along a stabilized front.

The enemy took advantage of a lull in big-scale fighting to emplace more artillery, add to his armor, strengthen his manpower, replace tired and decimated divisions, bring up more supplies to the front. United Nations artillery and the Navy and Fifth Air Force's air interdiction program, while they did not rob the enemy of his offensive capability, did take a heavy toll in supplies and materially affected his transportation system.

The Eighth Army meanwhile was building also—strengthening its defenses, replacing troops under the rotation system, improving its supply usually untroubled by enemy artillery

and air and, most important of all, equipping and training the ROK units to a high level of combat effectiveness.

Virtually a new ROK army had developed by 1952. The proof came early in April. Two Chinese companies attacked an outpost position of the 6th Company of the 7th Regiment of the 6th ROK Division with the clear intention of seizing and defending it against counterattack. This company of a division which had broken disastrously a year before, now held, though a third of its number was either killed or wounded.

On the same day, elements of two enemy battalions attacked an outpost line guarded by the ROK Marines. They, too, were expertly repulsed. And on 16 April, the Chinese once again tried to take the ROK 6th Company outpost. One hundred and fifty-seven Chinese were killed as the ROK troops held.

The ROKs named their battle west of the Pukhan River *No Yogi Isora*—"Stay fight!"—byword of Lieutenant General Paik Sun Yup, commander of the newly formed ROK II Corps. General James A. Van Fleet, Eighth Army Commander, said, "The magnificent stand of this company would be a credit to the army of any nation. I feel that the actions at that outpost are important milestones in the development of a sound, capable fighting Korean Army."

In April, the power of United Nations armor in direct fire was clearly demonstrated along the central front as tanks were brought up to place direct fire on enemy bunkers and other fortifications. Hundreds of Chinese bunkers, weapons emplacements and buildings south of Pyongyang, north of Kumsu and southwest of Jumsong were damaged by tanks firing from fixed positions along the main line of resistance of the 7th and 40th Divisions. There were occasional raids into enemy territory throughout April and May.

The enemy, with twice as many men and with more artillery than the Eighth Army, showed no intention of duplicating his offensives of May and June 1951. Spring brought little change. The line of contact established at Panmunjom on 27 November 1951 remained virtually the same.

Air Action

Although ground action along the Korean front was relatively quiet during most of the first six months of 1952, the United Nations Command continued its around-the-clock air operations against the Communists.

Operation Strangle—the intensified interdiction campaign



Inspecting the base camp of the United Nations truce team are (left to right) General Matthew B. Ridgway, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy and Generals Mark W. Clark and James A. Van Fleet.

U. S. Army Photograph

begun in August 1951 to prevent a major offensive by Communist ground forces by reducing the flow of enemy supplies and reinforcements—was continued by Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers and B-26's, and Far East Air Forces B-29's based in Japan and Okinawa. Railroad lines, marshalling yards, bridges and supply and troop shelters were primary targets. Both light and medium bombers engaged in night strikes, with the B-29's ranging up to the Yalu River in radar-controlled attacks. F-86 Sabrejets flew cover support for the bombers and patrolled up to the Yalu, taking a heavy toll of enemy fighters. Fighter-bombers meanwhile delivered constant air support to United Nations ground forces, accounting for more than twenty-three hundred gun positions and approximately seventy-five tanks destroyed or damaged.

From the beginning of the Korean campaign to mid-1952, United Nations pilots have accounted for 1180 enemy planes of all types. This includes a MIG total of 336 destroyed, 75 probables and 513 damaged. During the same period, 637 United Nations planes were lost by combat, ground fire and undetermined causes; of these 376 were propeller-driven craft.

Air activity reached its peak on 23 June when American

aircraft, in their largest and most lethal strikes up to that time in the Korean conflict, destroyed approximately 90 percent of North Korea's power potential in raids on five of the country's most productive hydroelectric plants. More than five hundred Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force planes took part in the precision attacks. All returned to their bases. Primary target of the mammoth sweep was the huge Suiho hydroelectric plant on the south bank of the Yalu River northeast of Antung. Before the raid its powerhouses supplied industrial energy for much of Manchuria and all electricity for the two Korean metropolitan areas of Pyongyang and Chinnampo. The Suiho plant was the fourth largest in the world.

War at Sea

United Nations surface vessels continued to control the sea lanes around Korea and support the ground troops by shelling key cities, supply centers and vital transportation facilities on both coasts. The key port of Wonsan, first shelled on 16 February 1951, was placed under the longest siege in United States naval history. The United Nations fleet, which consisted of one light cruiser and four destroyers at the beginning of the campaign, now numbered over four hundred vessels, more than two hundred of them from the U. S. Navy.

Navy and Marine carrier and land-based aircraft continued to play a vital role in Operation Strangle while continuing to fly close-support missions for the ground troops. Planes and ships inflicted 14,433 enemy casualties during the first half of 1952. They destroyed or damaged 3586 railroad cars, 2175 trucks and other vehicles and 706 gun positions; bombing and artillery action cut enemy rail lines in twelve thousand places, more than four times the figure for all of 1951. Eighty-seven enemy aircraft were destroyed and eighty-eight damaged.

Peace Talks and Prisoners

At the beginning of 1952, United Nations negotiators at Panmunjom offered the Red representatives a five-point package. The United Nations would agree (1) on limited instead of unlimited troop rotation; (2) inspection teams from neutral nations for behind-the-lines observation; (3) a double instead of a single inspection system (one group behind the lines, one for the buffer zones); (4) no air observation by United Nations planes; and (5) rehabilitation of certain North Korean airfields for civilian use. These concessions would be made provided

the Reds agreed, positively, not to construct or use airfields for military purposes.

In February, the two remaining items to be settled were the Communists' right to build airfields during the armistice and the right of prisoners of war of both sides to voluntary repatriation. Later, an additional item of disagreement arose when the Communists proposed that Russia be included as a "neutral" in the body to supervise the armistice.

The Communists were meanwhile reiterating the Peking radio's propaganda charges that United Nations planes had bombed Manchuria. They also accused the United Nations of barbarously massacring Korean civilians at the Koje Island prison camp. The Communists insisted that they would hold out forever if necessary against the United Nations proposal for the voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. They continued to demand that Russia be accepted as one of the six "neutral nations on the truce committee."

On 25 March staff officers reached general agreement on Item 3 concerning ports of entry. The ports named by the United Nations were Pusan, Taegu, Kangnung, Kunsan and Inchon, and for the Communists, Sinuiju, Sinanju, Hungnam, Chongjin and Manpo.

Two weeks later, on 19 April, the United Nations Command informed the Communists that a screening of United Nations-held prisoners revealed that less than seventy thousand were willing to return and would not forcibly resist repatriation. The result of this screening was startling not only to the Communists but to the world.

On 28 April, the United Nations Command made its final proposal for the solution of the military armistice conference deadlock. At the plenary session of that date, the United Nations command made a package proposal, which was its final offer: (1) no reference to restrictions on airfield rehabilitation or construction; (2) an exchange of approximately seventy thousand United Nations-held prisoners for twelve thousand Communist-held prisoners; and (3) the armistice supervisory commission to consist of Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Not only did the Communists reject this proposal but since that time have used the sporadic meetings as a propaganda fountainhead for announcing a counter-proposal which insisted that *all* prisoners be returned, regardless of their personal preference. This counter-proposal also accepted the four

nations mentioned in the United Nations Commission offer.

Meanwhile the stand of the United Nations Command against Communist evasion and vituperation has been patient but firm. Admiral C. Turner Joy and Major General (now Lieutenant General) William K. Harrison, his successor after 23 May, listened to the Communists and repeatedly said that if the Communists had nothing to offer but talk, the conference should recess. Nearly every meeting in May and June was at the insistence of the Communists. The United Nations negotiators have continued patiently to explain their position so long as there is any possibility that the Communists would modify their stand. At the half-year mark the meetings of the negotiators continued intermittently without any real progress having been made on the key issue of prisoner exchange.

Far from the battle lines, the island of Koje off the south-east tip of Korea drew the spotlight of world attention during May and early June 1952.

On 7 May Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, commander of United Nations Prisoner of War Camp Number One on Koje-do, went to the gate of Compound 76 to confer with spokesmen for the prisoners. A group of prisoners seized him and dragged him inside the compound, where he was held for seventy-eight hours before he was released.

The timing of this incident, the demands submitted by the interned Red prisoners as conditions for the release of General Dodd, and the references made by Communist representatives at Panmunjom to this and subsequent events on Koje-do left little doubt that violence on the island was planned and instigated by the Communists in an effort to embarrass the United Nations and influence the armistice negotiations.

After an Army investigation of the incident, reductions to the grade of colonel were ordered for General Dodd and his successor as commander of the prisoner-of-war camp. Brigadier General Charles F. Colson. An official reprimand was given Brigadier General Paul F. Yount, commander of the 2d Logistical Command, under which the camp was operated.

Brigadier General (now Major General) Haydon L. Boatner was appointed commander on Koje-do on 13 May and was ordered by General Mark W. Clark,* commanding the United

*General Clark replaced General Matthew B. Ridgway on 12 May when the latter was ordered to Europe to assume command of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe.

Nations Command, to obtain "uncontested control" of the prisoner-of-war camp while continuing to comply with the requirements of the Geneva Convention governing the treatment of prisoners of war. Troops from several United Nations units were sent to reinforce guard detachments on the island.

Under General Boatner's direction, United Nations troops built a number of smaller compounds to replace the large compounds in which the prisoners and civilian internees, numbering about eighty thousand in all, were being held. They also destroyed flags and signs which the prisoners had raised in some compounds.

On 10 June General Boatner ordered prisoners in Compound 76 to assemble for movement to some of the smaller compounds. When the prisoners did not obey, troops of the United States 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team entered the compound and enforced the order despite savage resistance by prisoners armed with spears, gasoline grenades and other weapons. The Americans did not fire a shot but defended themselves with their bayonets, rifle butts and concussion grenades. One American soldier and thirty-one prisoners were killed. Some of the prisoners were killed by their fellow prisoners as they attempted to obey General Boatner's order.

United Nations troops then proceeded to move prisoners and internees out of other compounds into the smaller enclosures. They encountered no resistance. However, several prisoners in Compound 77 were murdered before the inmates of that compound complied with orders to assemble for movement. It was believed those murdered were anti-Communists who were executed by their fellow prisoners. Known leaders and instigators of violence among the Communist prisoners were segregated and, by the middle of June, it appeared that order was being fully restored on Koje-do.

Civil Assistance to the Koreans

While sporadic fighting and long-drawn-out peace talks continued, misery and distress in the war-torn Republic of Korea were being alleviated through the tireless efforts of soldiers and civilians participating in the United Nations civil assistance program. The program has a two-fold purpose: to supply relief and support where and when it is needed, and to provide the assistance and supplies required to permit the Koreans to help themselves. In this way, the civilian population is given both the direct and indirect relief it requires, and the United


Nations military operation is assured freedom from the disruptive influences of disease, starvation and unrest behind the fighting front.

The program in the Far East Command is directed by Headquarters, United Nations Command, G5 (Civil Affairs). The field operating agency is the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCACK), a major command of Eighth Army (EUSAK) charged with formulating plans and policies in the field of civil assistance throughout the Army area. In the tactical area, EUSAK's operational responsibilities are met by corps and division Civil Assistance Teams. The structure of UNCACK parallels that of the Republic of Korea government. Headquarters of the command is at the temporary seat of the Republic of Korea government in Pusan and, through its chain of command, extends to teams in each provincial capital.

The UNCACK teams, as well as the headquarters organization itself, are composed of regular military personnel, Department of the Army civilians, and employees from various international relief and welfare organizations.

In the health field UNCACK has taken the lead in restoring safe water supplies, introducing proper methods for disposal of human waste and garbage, and combating insect-borne diseases. With the assistance of Korean medical teams, it has administered more than sixty-six million inoculations to check the spread of smallpox, typhus and cholera. Newly established field hospitals, surgical units and dispensaries have cared for more than two and one-half million patients. UNCACK has helped feed and clothe four million refugees.

The construction and rehabilitation of roads, bridges, port, harbor and communication facilities, the provision of railroad rolling stock and of floating power barges are all projects which are serving joint military-civilian purposes. UNCACK's mission also involves providing equipment and raw materials to sustain agriculture, fisheries, mining and other industrial and public services. In addition, UNCACK acts in an advisory capacity and assists the Republic of Korea in fiscal, economic, medical and other affairs.



ACADEMY FOR LEADERSHIP

CORPORAL ROBERT L. STOCK

IF NAPOLEON'S remark that a marshal's baton can be found in every soldier's knapsack is true, then the United States Army is figuratively examining every enlisted man's knapsack. The Army seeks to develop leaders at every echelon, and wherever United States troops are stationed, from Japan to Germany, noncommissioned officer schools are teaching young soldiers the art of military leadership.

One of these schools, the 1st Infantry Division Artillery Noncommissioned Officers Academy, is located in the red brick barracks of an old German artillery *caserne* in the centuries-old Bavarian city of Erlangen. Here, in streets and on parade grounds which once echoed to the rattle and clank of horse-drawn guns of the Kaiser's army, American soldiers are learning the skills which will make them better noncommissioned officers and better artillerymen.

The Academy's objectives are three-fold: to develop leadership, to develop instructor ability, and to increase the noncommissioned officers' sense of responsibility. A booklet issued to each student states that "The mission of the Academy is to establish in its graduates, both noncommissioned officers and potential noncommissioned officers, high standards of responsi-

CORPORAL ROBERT L. STOCK, USA, is on duty in Headquarters Company, 1st Infantry Division. Photographs illustrating this article are by Sergeant Maurice R. Koonce of 1st Signal Company, 1st Infantry Division.

bility, leadership and instructor ability; and to provide a thorough knowledge and understanding of basic artillery subjects and organization."

The Academy conducts two courses—an eight-week noncommissioned officers course for first three graders and a six-week basic artillery course for privates first class and corporals. Both courses teach leadership and the art of instructing, and corporals who finish the basic artillery curriculum may then attend the noncommissioned officers course.

Established in October 1950, the Academy has since graduated more than thirteen hundred students, most of them young, career-minded soldiers who were carefully selected by their unit commanders. The commandant of the Academy, Major John J. Crockett, is proud of their records since graduation. He gives the example of one battalion which has sent nearly one hundred men to school. "That battalion was brand new and naturally wasn't rated too highly when the school opened," he points out, "but now it has one of the best ratings in the division.

"As for the men themselves," the major adds, "I'd say that the average graduate has advanced two grades since leaving here. A considerable number have gone on to officer candidate schools and many others will surely follow them."

To graduate from the Academy, the student must live up to a rigorous daily schedule. Reveille rouses him at 0600, whereupon he cleans his room and has breakfast before classes which start as early as 0745. After his last class ends at 1645, he stands retreat and inspection, and between 1800 and 2000 he studies for the next day's lessons.

Learning to be a good leader keeps the student busy most of the time. He studies the psychology of leadership, the objectives and responsibilities of an Army leader, the problems of combat leadership and the personal qualities a man must have before he can command others. He takes a difficult test designed to measure his reactions under stress—a practical problem which calls for every ounce of skill and quick thinking plus a good working knowledge of squad tactics. Put in charge of a squad, he must lead it through two combat situations that test his ability to reach a swift, sound decision. Following a long, twisting course through the hill country near the school, the student leader has to handle his squad in the face of "enemy" forces, played by the school's instructors, who pop up unexpectedly.

Decisiveness is a big factor in this test, and a man is graded on the spot by another instructor following behind the squad.



A 1st Infantry Division artillery class is briefed on the functioning of a 105-mm. howitzer.

U. S. Army Photograph



A corporal is graded on his ability to lead men through the "Russian Obstacle Course" without a man touching a white line.

U. S. Army Photograph

To achieve a good grade the student must act quickly, whether the problem is disarming a "prisoner," picking off a "sniper," or beating back an "enemy" patrol.

Handling his squad on the drill field also gives the student more training in leadership. To pass the drill and command phases of leadership training he must march the squad through an obstacle course of sharp corners and narrow lanes. He must know when and how to give every command in the drill book, else his squad will tread on one of the white test lines and this will count as a mark against him.

Meanwhile, the student must learn how to be a good Army instructor. He is told that the average soldier spends 90 percent of his time either teaching or being taught—and all of his time learning. He learns the five stages of Army instruction: preparation by the instructor, presentation to the students, application by the students, examination by the instructor and discussion by instructor and students.

Besides developing a feeling for leadership and learning to instruct others, the student must develop a sense of responsibility. Each week senior students rotate in their assignments within the student battalion, from battery commander to first sergeant. They also head all formations, make room inspections and lead the battalion in semi-monthly reviews.

Other general military subjects round out the student's knowledge. He studies map reading, military justice, personnel administration, intelligence, supply administration, military hygiene and sanitation.

Throughout his training, the student never forgets that he is an artilleryman. The Academy's big gun course starts with the organization and mission of an artillery battalion; then it concentrates on the parts, functioning and operation of a howitzer. It also touches on the role of the fire direction center and forward artillery observer and ends with the setting up and camouflaging of a gun position.

To gain the most benefit, the student spends much of his time on the weapon of his battalion, possibly a 105-mm. howitzer. But he also examines other artillery pieces—the 155-mm. howitzer and the M16 and M19 anti-aircraft mounts.

Good training emphasizes practical experience. Thus in forward observer training, the student crouches in a foxhole overlooking a miniature terrain layout while steel balls fired from a compressed air gun send up spurts of sand before him. By watching these spurts and calling his corrections to a fire direc-

tion center he brings the rounds on the target.

In or out of the classroom, the student at Erlangen is subject to the Academy's demerit system. He is checked daily on his personal appearance, on the condition of his room and equipment, and on his military courtesy. Demerits bring restrictions of recreation privileges and too many demerits will disqualify the student from the Academy entirely.

Discipline, however, is not inflexible. There is a student council where representatives from each of the classes meet once a week to present student problems, air complaints and suggestions to the faculty. If a student feels he has been given demerits unjustly, he may appeal to have them removed. The commandant notes each student's complaint or suggestion, offers advice if it fits the situation and, if a complaint is justified, he takes prompt corrective action.

The commandant also asks each student to fill out a comment sheet upon graduation. These turn up a remarkable number of good suggestions and spot faults which otherwise might be overlooked. One graduate, for example, thought the mess lines moved too slowly, so he submitted a diagram showing how to move the students into the mess hall at a faster rate.



A master sergeant shows the fine points of an anti-aircraft gun sight to two students at the School.

U. S. Army Photograph

Several military ceremonies mark the Academy's brief traditions. "Reviewing the colors" is one of them. With the student battalion drawn up in line, the honor battery marches forward to present the national colors to the student battalion commander while the band plays *To the Colors*. The student officers then troop the line and the battalion passes in review. Lieutenant General Frank W. Milburn, former commanding general of the 1st Infantry Division, who visited the Academy in the fall of 1951 after commanding the I Corps in Korea, commented that the impressive ceremony was reminiscent of his cadet days at West Point.

Behind the colorful ceremonies, however, stands a firm awareness of the needs of modern warfare. The 1st Division Artillery commander, Brigadier General Eric S. Molitor, has summed up the problem of training military leaders in this era of advanced technology. "Modern artillery weapons, communications, vehicles and fire control equipment all require highly skilled operators," he says. "The course at the Academy is designed to increase the student's technical knowledge of his profession, to teach him how to instruct his subordinates, to develop poise, bearing, manners, speech and other evidences of self-confidence, and to explain thoroughly the obligations of his rank and position. He leaves the Academy better equipped to carry out his responsibilities at his own unit or battery."

Many of these students will be officers some day, but today they are good noncommissioned officers which is the important thing now. For as Major Crockett says, "It is just as important to have good noncommissioned officers as good officers, especially in combat. If the enemy knocks out the officers, it is the noncoms who must run the show. They had better be good."



These two Weimaraners were brought to Camp Kilmer by their owner, though they will travel alone to Germany.

"HIS FAITHFUL DOG SHALL BEAR HIM COMPANY"

WHEN ALEXANDER POPE, writing his *Essay on Man* more than two hundred years ago, said "His faithful dog shall bear him company" he could not have known that his bit of philosophizing would, two centuries later, describe a standing operation of the United States Army


But today Pope's prophecy applies, for if a soldier going to Europe so desires, his faithful dog *does* bear him company as they travel in strange lands. The personnel staging area at Camp Kilmer even has a counterpart in the pet staging area located there. Aristocratic Russian wolfhounds, lumbering Saint Bernards, tiny Mexican Chihuahuas, spirited terriers, pedigreed and mongrel, are processed for shipment to stations in the European Command. Like their masters, the dog voyagers have records which must be checked, physical examinations which must show good health, preventive inoculations to insure against disease, before they may proceed.

The owner is responsible for getting his dog to Camp Kilmer, for providing a cage of ample size in which to make the journey and for furnishing pans for food and water, a collar, leash and muzzle. He must also pay a charge of fifteen dollars for care and feeding of his pet from Camp Kilmer to Bremerhaven.

When the dog "reports in," the Post Veterinarian Clinic takes over and arranges the details from there on. Pet shipments leave Camp Kilmer once or twice a month. Handlers are selected from among volunteers in the troop shipment which is scheduled for the same transport. These volunteers, under the supervision of an officer, take care of four or five dogs each—feeding, cleaning and exercising them during the voyage. The handler receives, as extra compensation, half of the fee paid by the owner; the balance of the fee goes for food for the dog. If the owner travels on the same vessel, he normally takes care of his dog himself.

Since the Pet Staging Area was established in September 1951, close to five hundred dogs—and a dozen or so cats—have been processed for shipment.


Accompanying photographs are by Corporal Raoul R. Gaudreu, Post Signal Office, Camp Kilmer, New Jersey.



Most dogs arrive at the Pet Staging Area by express. The owner must provide a sturdy crate for the sea voyage ahead, pans for food and water, and collar, leash and muzzle.



Blondie "reports in" at the Camp Kilmer Pet Staging Area. Clerical records carry data on owner, destination and health status of the new arrival.



This Boston bull terrier gets a medical check-up and any immunization shots required. All dogs must have a recent rabies inoculation and, if under two years old, a distemper shot.



Dogs eat heartily—and amicably! Three types of pet food are on the menu. Animals are exercised daily and receive excellent care while awaiting transit and en route.



"Goodbye, U.S.A." This Boxer goes aboard ship to join his master in Germany. He is fed, watered and exercised during the voyage by a volunteer handler to insure his arrival in good shape.

SOLDIER VOTING-- THEN AND NOW

MAJOR JACK MCKINLEY HERTZOG

THROUGH the years much has been accomplished in facilitating voting by Armed Forces personnel. Yet some service personnel may have discovered for the first time this year that it is difficult, or perhaps impossible, to exercise their right of suffrage. While some mistakenly blame their difficulties on Federal governmental agencies, actually the entire question originates in the application of state election laws; in fact the United States Constitution carefully leaves suffrage qualifications up to each state.

It should be remembered, too, that large numbers of civilians are also absent from their state of voting residence due to the circumstances of their employment and, like their fellow-voters in the service, must also meet requirements under their state laws.

When the Constitution was drafted back in 1787, it was not contemplated that large numbers of people would be away from home at election time; and certainly it was never anticipated that large numbers of American men and women would be stationed in foreign lands. In fact, it was not even firmly established that this country would have universal suffrage. At first practically all states determined the right to vote on a property basis. Others adopted a poll tax; others set up educational qualifications. One or two even had religious bars. Most of the Founding Fathers believed that only men of means and education were able properly to participate at the polls; and some even went so far as to state that no country could ever have all of its people educated—the cost would be too great! (Who could have foreseen the era of free public schools?)

Thomas Jefferson, who took office in 1801, worked hard to have the base of suffrage broadened. Later, during the Jack-

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sonian era, when property qualifications were largely being abandoned, the doctrine was put forth that men subject to military service especially deserve the right to vote. It was contended that when a man is called on to risk his life, he should have something to say about the selection of those who would decide when and how that life should be risked. But while that argument was used once more to broaden the suffrage base, it did not extend to the small Regular Army.

By the time of the Civil War, suffrage had been extended to include all white male citizens; but the various states had differing qualifications, as they still do. (Even today one state—Texas—refuses to allow members of the *regular* Armed Forces the right to cast a ballot.) As late as 1860 there was no provision whereby a soldier or sailor could cast his ballot outside his voting district. But during the Civil War—fought by soldiers on both sides who were for the most part voters—it was patently unjust that a man engaged in defending his government should be deprived of his right to participate in that government. For the first time, then, the various state legislatures sought to correct the inequity.

Numerous difficulties were encountered. All state constitutions differed, and some were so worded that absentee voting was apparently not even permissible. Registration laws also differed in various states. As a further complication, Article I, section 4 of the Constitution of the United States provides that "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators." This was interpreted as permitting the states to designate places where votes should be cast unless otherwise controlled by the Congress. It therefore appeared possible for each state to enact laws permitting soldiers to vote for presidential electors and members of Congress, although the same state might not be able to permit absentee voting for local offices.

At any rate, between 1861 and 1865 twenty-five states had wrestled with the problem sufficiently to enact laws on the subject. These fell into two general categories. In the first, laws provided for taking the ballot box to the soldier in the field, under supervision of election commissioners sent by the state, or of military personnel acting as election officials. The second was a form of proxy voting by which the soldier could

send his ballot to a relative or friend who would cast the ballot in the voting precinct back home. Thus the soldier was held to be casting his vote in his home precinct. In the literal meaning of the law, this was not considered absentee voting.

The War Department co-operated fully in the administration of both types of voting laws. General Ulysses S. Grant wrote to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, strongly urging full co-operation and outlining his ideas on how the Army should assist. Many citizens criticized any method of absentee voting by members of the Union Army because they feared that the soldiers would be lined up and ordered to vote as the colonel of the regiment might desire. General Grant, however, ordered "no political meetings, no harangues from soldiers or citizens, and no canvassing of camps or regiments for votes." He also made arrangements for civilian representatives from the various states to go to the camps to superintend the voting.

In 1864 it was estimated that there were about 1,300,000 men in the Union Army who were disenfranchised except insofar as the soldiers' voting laws of the states applied to them. About 150,000 votes were cast in the field and 71,500 by proxy—or about 7.5 percent of the total vote of four million cast during the election. So far as has ever been established, only in Maryland did the soldier vote control the outcome of any of the state elections. There the soldier vote secured, by a majority of three hundred and seventy-five, the adoption of a new state constitution which abolished slavery—and also provided for soldier voting in the field. Since the old constitution did not provide for soldier voting, there was a hot contest as to whether those votes should have been allowed to count in the first place. However the courts upheld the validity of the votes.

After the Civil War the state soldier voting laws either expired or were repealed. In some cases they were simply omitted from the codified statutes. During the Spanish-American War some states again authorized voting in the field or by proxy. Also in 1898 the first attempt was made in Congress to enact Federal legislation. A bill was introduced which would have authorized units from states serving in the Army at the time of a Congressional election to open a poll and conduct an election for representatives in Congress. It met opposition on the grounds that registration of voters was a state qualification which could not be dispensed with by the Congress, and that at least two states would not qualify persons in the Armed Forces. The bill was passed by the House but died in the Senate.

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Unlike the period of the Civil War, there was no presidential election during the war with Spain; thus the normal stimulus to voting interest was lacking. After the war the interest in soldier voting dwindled. But World War I revived it again.

At the time of the general election in November 1917—an "off year" since there was no presidential campaign—some million soldiers were within the continental United States and about one hundred thousand more were overseas, mostly in France. Eight states were holding elections. New York made a special effort to enable her servicemen to vote, largely because of the great interest in the mayoralty race in New York City. Following the voting precedent set in the Civil War, New York conducted balloting in camps, posts and stations and in France as well. Some of the other states, however, employed absentee ballots which were mailed to the soldiers.

The War Department provided every practicable assistance, both in the United States and abroad. Registration lists were furnished to various states; commanders of camps and divisions were instructed to co-operate fully and camp facilities were made available to aid in voting. A good example was the manner in which voting was conducted by the 27th Division, composed largely of New York soldiers, at Camp Wadsworth, South Carolina. Each company commander distributed ballots; four New York soldiers, two Democrats and two Republicans, officiated as election inspectors. Ballot boxes were set up at the end of each company street and voting took place from 0800 to 1600 on 6 November.

New York was the only state to send commissioners overseas. Incidentally it later was estimated that it cost New York more than six dollars for each of the votes cast throughout the Army and Navy—27,337 soldiers and sailors, of which 3061 were cast by soldiers in France. All in all, the 1917 soldier vote was quite small except for the New York tally.

Following this experience, the War Department gave some consideration to the advisability of initiating a Federal law on the subject. A bill was drafted by the Judge Advocate General in January 1918, covering soldier and sailor voting for Senators, Representatives and Presidential electors. It never was submitted to the Congress, however, because General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, was of the opinion that the votes of soldiers overseas could not be obtained "without seriously interfering with the military efficiency of our fighting forces."

As a matter of fact, by the time election rolled around in the fall of 1918 the American forces were heavily engaged in several sectors. There was no soldier voting overseas in 1918, although up to October of that year studies were being made as to the feasibility of voting by members of the AEF.

Within the continental United States it was, of course, a different story. Soldiers voted either "on the spot" at their encampments or by state absentee ballot in the 1918 general election. The War Department co-operated fully. But with some two million men under arms in the United States, the total domestic soldier vote was comparatively small.

Following World War I the interest in soldier voting again died down. However, the general trend of American life had itself changed considerably since the days of the Civil War. In the intervening years many states had made arrangements for absentee voting by citizens who would be away from home at election time. With the calling out of the National Guard in 1940, interest in soldier voting again began to be expressed and several states liberalized their voting laws in 1941 and 1942.

During the 1942 elections more Americans were in uniform than ever before in our history. About 5,700,000 were scattered over five continents and all the oceans. Even though progress had been made, large numbers of those in the military service were ineligible to vote.

No absentee voting was permitted by Delaware, Kentucky and New Mexico, while Florida permitted it only within the borders of the state. Personal registration was a prerequisite for absent voting in eighteen other states—a requirement obviously impossible for most soldiers to fulfill. Five other states used a system of periodic rather than permanent registration. In many states permitting absentee voting, the law failed to allow sufficient time for a soldier at a distant duty station to obtain and return his ballot. For instance, although the round trip mail service between San Francisco and Sydney, Australia, was forty-two days, Vermont law directed that completed ballots must be returned within twelve days! Thirty-two states allowed less than forty-five days for the mailing out, marking and return of ballots, which made it physically impossible for many servicemen overseas to vote by absentee ballot. Some states extended the deadline for receipt of ballots. Service personnel within the zone of interior were not so penalized by the rules. Seven states still had a poll tax prerequisite, which served as an obstacle to many servicemen and women.

Some of the impediments to service voting were removed by passage of Public Law 712—77th Congress, approved 16 September 1942. Effective only in time of war, the Act provided that no person in the Armed Forces might be denied the opportunity to vote for members of Congress and for Presidential electors because of absence or failure to comply with state laws prescribing registration or payment of poll tax.

Under Public Law 712, members of the Armed Forces were supplied with a postcard application blank for a war ballot which could be forwarded to the Secretary of State of his home state, thus establishing eligibility to vote. State authorities then were required to return a special war ballot containing names of candidates for Congress and Presidential electors. In states where authorized, the ballot also would carry names of candidates for state and local offices. The war ballot had to be returned to local election officials before the closing of polls on Election Day. If, however, state laws permitted full absentee voting, use of the war ballot was not required.

The 1942 law did not produce impressive results. For one thing, it was in effect only six weeks before Election Day; for another, in many Southern states the outcome of the election had already been virtually decided in the primaries which were held much earlier. Nor did the Federal law change the time lag problem inherent in some of the state laws. Besides, many service personnel found state absentee ballots available and therefore did not utilize the war ballots.

In the next Congress, more than fifty bills were introduced to facilitate service voting. Out of this welter emerged a compromise measure, Public Law 277—78th Congress which became law without the President's signature on 1 April 1944.

Public Law 277 required the Secretaries of War and Navy and the Administrator of the War Shipping Administration to make the postcard application form available to those serving "in the armed forces of the United States or in the merchant marine of the United States, or serving in the American Red Cross, the Society of Friends, the Women's Auxiliary Service Pilots or the United Service Organization and attached to and serving with the armed forces of the United States."

The Act repealed all of the 1942 law except those sections waiving registration requirements and payment of poll taxes. It further urged states to liberalize their own election laws and suggested that the Federal postcard fulfill the dual function of accomplishing registration and requesting a state ballot.

The law also provided for a special Federal war ballot in voting for United States Senators, Representatives and Presidential electors in certain instances where a state ballot was unavailable. The Act further contained provisions forbidding any attempts by superiors to influence votes of subordinates or any dissemination of bulk "political propaganda" in the Armed Forces.

Between January 1944 and the national election in November, the legislatures of thirty-eight states modified their laws on service voting. By 15 July 1944 the governors of all the states were able to certify that procedure for absentee voting had been established for those in the military service, thereby barring use of the Federal ballot to servicemen on duty in the United States. Most states increased the time interval between sending out and receipt of ballots. All except South Carolina agreed to accept the Federal postcard as an application for a state absentee ballot. The requirement of personal registration was continued, however, by four states (in 1942 twenty-one had had such requirements). Texas and Arkansas were the only states that continued to demand that servicemen pay a poll tax. Most of the states further met the request of the Congress for use of a standard envelope, distinctively marked, and for the size and weight of ballots and voting materials to be reduced for transmission through the mails.

As a result of efforts by state and Federal authorities, a service vote of more than two million six hundred thousand state ballots and about eighty-five thousand Federal ballots were recorded. This represented 29.1 percent of the service personnel eligible, whereas civilian voting was estimated at 58 percent in the 1944 elections.

This was by far the best record made during any of the wartime periods in which service votes were cast by absentee ballots. Although the outcome was considered good at the time, the circumstances were not ideal. The Federal statute was found by the War and Navy Departments to be administratively difficult at best and nearly unworkable in some aspects. Besides, constant changes in state laws and rulings increased the Army and Navy difficulties because these changes had to be forwarded to Armed Forces personnel who were scattered all over the world. At least one voting officer is known to have been killed by enemy fire; others were killed or injured in accidents.

In addition to the difficulties imposed on the Army and Navy, the state and local election officials themselves had to

work under many handicaps. Some of the legislation was hastily drawn and some problems were actually solved on an improvised basis. By the end of 1944 temporary laws were already expiring and most state officials considered the war over in 1945 even though the laws themselves did not automatically lapse then.

Early in 1945 the United States War Ballot Commission—composed of the Secretaries of War and Navy and the Administrator of the War Shipping Administration, as specified in Public Law 277—made a thorough report of the experience in 1944. Their proposals for amendments to existing law were incorporated in Public Law 348—79th Congress enacted in 1946. This Act eliminated the Federal ballot and reduced the role of the Federal Government in the voting process to furnishing postcard applications for state ballots. It also carried a series of recommendations to the states which were somewhat more pointed than the law it superseded. In omitting the qualifying phrase “in time of war,” the Act is intended as permanent legislation rather than an expedient. The recommendations called for adoption of liberal rules on registration, allowance of ample time for service personnel to receive and return ballots, and limitation of size and weight of balloting material. In addition, certain provisions of existing law were retained, such as the wartime waiver of poll tax and registration requirements and the prohibition of political propaganda.

Meanwhile, certain states had begun making changes in their absentee voting laws. Wisconsin, for example, altered its statutes to permit those in the Armed Forces to apply for both primary and general election ballots with a single communication; Tennessee and New Mexico revised their laws to allow absent servicemen to vote in primary as well as general elections; Arkansas exempted military personnel from paying the poll tax while Texas adopted constitutional amendments that are still in effect.

On the other hand, other states entirely repealed their wartime statutes on absent voting. Between 1946 and 1948 several states terminated service voting laws without replacing them. And temporary laws lapsed automatically in other states. As of 1948, four states refused to permit servicemen to vote by absentee ballot while twenty-three refused to permit absentee registration. Further, in 1950, at least nine states would not accept the Federal postcard as an application for a ballot while many others reverted to election schedules which failed

to permit sufficient time for service personnel to obtain and return ballots.

Some states, however, have revised their election laws to extend absentee voting privileges to civilians serving the United States Government and the Armed Forces overseas. And at least two—Ohio and Oklahoma—have adopted permanent laws extending such privileges to absent servicemen and women.

After the fighting began in Korea, the Congress made two minor amendments to existing Federal law. One required that the Federal postcard ballot application be handed to every eligible person, rather than simply making such cards available. The second granted free airmail postage to balloting material regardless of weight.

As a result of the recommendations in Public Law 348, reinforced by public opinion generated since 1950, the legislatures of at least fourteen states have turned to the task of liberalizing their laws on absent voting. Only four of the fourteen acts so far adopted are temporary, covering only the 1952 elections; the other ten are permanent laws designed to protect the rights of service personnel in the future.

These new statutes mainly address themselves to solving the problems of personal registration, extending the time allowed for round trip travel of the ballot, permitting dispatch of a ballot at request of an individual's relatives or friends, and altering dates for filing candidacies and printing ballots. Four of the laws provide for a bi-partisan state war ballot commission to supervise execution of state laws on service voting.

Although some states have not taken current steps to enlarge opportunities for service personnel to vote, every individual is encouraged to take advantage of the many opportunities available to exercise this franchise.



HURRICANE HUNTERS

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER NICHOLAS BRANGO

IF YOU LIKE riding a roller coaster on a rough track in a wind tunnel with cold water pouring down your neck, you probably would enjoy life with the Navy's Hurricane Hunter reconnaissance squadron.

For it is the job of this unit to take to the air whenever a hurricane is reported and to fly around it, into it, or a combination of both, to discover its course and to determine the force and direction of the wind, the rain and the waves. The squadron averages some fifty such jaunts during the hurricane season which usually runs from June through November. During the "off" season, the squadron conducts specific meteorological projects or reverts to training for such comparatively humdrum work as aerial mining and antisubmarine warfare exercises.

Getting intimately acquainted with a hurricane is no dull affair, especially when it is necessary to circle or to penetrate one of these atmospheric upheavals at an altitude of three hundred to seven hundred feet! A hurricane is one of nature's most destructive storms, with winds on the periphery attaining velocities of more than a hundred miles an hour while a dead calm prevails at its center or "eye." These storms cause great damage, both at sea and on land. The driving winds frequently force

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torrential rain through the walls of houses—that is, those houses that are not entirely demolished by the big blow.

To study and thus anticipate the effects of violent tropical sea-storms is the function of the Joint Hurricane Warning Service conducted by the Navy, the Air Force and the Weather Bureau. As a result of forecasts issued by the Service, damage and loss of life due to storms have been cut down markedly.

Actually aerial weather reconnaissance is not a new development. It became a highly important source of operational planning information during World War II. With the cessation of hostilities, the experience of those engaged in this exciting and dangerous work was diverted into various channels. The group assigned to hurricane reconnaissance and tracking has since become one of the most valuable, as well as spectacular, peace-time aids rendered to the civilian population by the military.

The Joint Hurricane Warning Service is responsible for forecasting to the entire Atlantic and Gulf coasts and the West Indies, the course and direction of the big winds. The Weather Bureau Office in Miami, Florida, acts as the co-ordinating agency. Into this center flows all information regarding the storms—from ships, shore stations, aircraft and any other source. Here the data are plotted, evaluated, filtered and disseminated. The Air Force maintains a liaison officer at the Center to co-ordinate the efforts of the Air Force Weather Reconnaissance B-29's flying from Bermuda. The Navy contributes a Task Unit with headquarters at the Marine Corps Air Station at Miami.

This Task Unit's three major components are the Navy Weather Central at Miami; the high level radar reconnaissance aircraft of Operational Development Force, Atlantic Fleet (OpDevFor); and the low-level Hurricane Hunter reconnaissance squadron. The Weather Central is charged with directing activities of the reconnaissance planes and with plotting, forecasting and research. Aircraft of OpDevFor keep under radar surveillance any storm threatening the coast of the United States. This surveillance is especially important in darkness when the low-level visual observation techniques of the Hurricane Hunter squadron are hampered.


The low-level Hurricane Hunter reconnaissance squadron is based at the U. S. Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida. Assigned are six four-engined P4Y-2's, the Consolidated Privateer which was evolved during the latter part of World War II from the earlier B-24 Liberator. These combat patrol planes have been specially modified for hurricane work. Some of the

gun turrets and electronic gear have been removed to lighten the plane and to provide room for additional technical instruments used by the meteorologists.

Scientists define a hurricane as a violent cyclone occurring at sea. (A cyclone, incidentally, is "a system of winds circulating about a center of relatively low barometric pressure"; a tornado is "a very violent storm, of small extent, usually occurring on the southeastern border of a cyclone.") A cyclone is not necessarily a devastating storm—in fact, those in temperate latitudes often cover thousands of square miles without inflicting damage. But the hurricane, make no mistake about it, is a full-fledged storm. The name comes from "hurukan"—a term which the Carib Indians applied to violent storms.

The hurricane belt in the Northern Hemisphere extends from between Parallels 10 and 18, off the northern coast of South America, northwesterly to a point near the North American coast and then swings northeasterly to between Parallels 25 and 30, the area in which most of the state of Florida lies. However, hurricanes frequently ravage the Atlantic coast as far north as Nova Scotia. While the rotating winds often whip up to

TYPICAL CROSS-SECTION OF A HURRICANE



CLOUD FORMATIONS—KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

Ac—Altostratus
As—Altostratus
Cb—Cumulonimbus
Cs—Cirrostratus

Ci—Cirrus
Cu—Cumulus
Ns—Nimbostratus
Sc—Stratocumulus

speeds of more than one hundred miles an hour, the disturbance itself moves over the face of the earth at from ten to fifty miles an hour. The winds in the Northern Hemisphere travel counterclockwise, increasing in violence toward the center of the cyclonic disturbance. The center or "eye" itself may be quite calm. The drift and the rate at which the storm travels are factors of vital interest to shipping and coastal residents.

The low-level technique of observing the hurricane is strictly a Navy development. The Navy is immediately concerned with the whereabouts of the storm, its intensity and the sea conditions of potential danger to ships and shore installations. Low-level flights at altitudes only three hundred to seven hundred feet above the sea seem to be most suitable for accurately obtaining the necessary information. To aid such flights the Navy uses a radar altimeter in addition to the aneroid barometer. The electronic device gives the true altitude of the aircraft above the ocean's surface. Without it, an aircraft might soon find itself badly in need of a periscope!


The low-level observation technique is divided into three types—circumnavigation, penetration, or a combination of these. Although no two hurricanes are exactly alike, practically all of them may be divided into four quadrants of varying severity. It has been found that the right front quadrant is most severe, with the intensity of the winds diminishing progressively in the right rear, left front and left rear quadrants. Flights are planned to take advantage of this phenomenon.

A circumnavigation type of flight is usually scheduled when the storm center is known but the extent and velocity of the entire disturbance is to be surveyed. The pilot of the observation plane flies into the storm until he reaches a specified channel of wind speed. Normally the wind, traveling in a counterclockwise direction, forms a well defined pattern of speeds. Each speed circle is known technically as an "isovel."


To reach the desired isovel, the pilot places the wind to the port (left) of his aircraft and thus is carried gradually toward the eye of the storm. Having reached the desired isovel—whether it be seventy-five, sixty-five or forty miles an hour—the wind is placed to the starboard of dead astern. That keeps the aircraft on the desired speed circle and facilitates the flight of the aircraft completely around the storm. Reports are radioed to the tracking center where the configuration of the storm and the extent of the wind field are determined.

A penetration flight means exactly that—the airplane is or-

IDEALIZED HURRICANE WIND DIAGRAM



This idealized diagram shows the possible, run-in paths on a direct penetration flight. Under the conditions of the left rear quadrant, the pilot encounters winds which are the least severe.



This chart shows the possible flight paths using the circumnavigation technique. The shaded area illustrates the storm area by following the 60-mile-an-hour wind speed circle or inner.

dered to penetrate to the eye of the storm to determine its exact position. Usually the plane enters the storm at some point in the left front quadrant—the third least severe portion. From this “run-in spot,” with the wind maintained broad on the port beam, the drift will carry the plane into the center through the left rear, or weakest quadrant. This is purely a comparative term, however, for even the least severe portion of a hurricane is exceedingly turbulent.

Choosing the proper “run-in spot” is tricky business, for it is the point at which the wind is the reciprocal of the storm’s direction of motion. The pilot must watch for this point carefully as he may pass it quickly; if he does there is imminent danger that the drift may carry the aircraft into the most severe quadrant of the storm. Again, the run-in should be made as soon as possible, since crew fatigue increases rapidly as the plane is buffeted about. The wind forces the driving rain through the tiniest crack so that it is not unusual to have the entire flight deck immersed in water. Often the radio man cannot key his transmitter; the navigator finds it impossible to plot or the meteorologist to write on his observation forms. At such times all hands just hang on and mentally help the pilot do his difficult job.

But once the eye of the hurricane is reached, the roaring and the buffeting cease. Often the sky is blue, the sea calm, the wind balmy. Sea birds usually are floating tranquilly on the quiet sea or soaring as though no storm were within range. But the crew has a fuel problem to consider. After brewing a cup of coffee and relaxing momentarily, all hands brace for the return trip.

The trip out often is rougher than the trip in; but the psychological factor, the knowledge that they are outbound, helps to relieve the tension. When finally the outer edge of the storm is reached and the course is set for home, an exhilarating sense of relief becomes quite apparent.

Occasionally a flight combines both penetration and circumnavigation. This is by far the longest and most strenuous type of surveillance and is practicable only in less extensive storms.

To carry out such missions requires a taut, well-knit crew, each fully capable of doing his own work and sufficiently versed in the whole effort to catch any slight slip which might occur under stress. The crew normally consists of two pilots, two navigators and a meteorologist, usually all officers. The plane captain or crew chief is usually a chief petty officer. He has in his enlisted crew a radar-man, radioman, second mechanic, ordnance

This chart shows the possible flight paths using the circumnavigation technique. In the example illustrated, the pilot circumscribes the storm area by following the 60-mile-an-hour wind speed circle or isovel.

Since a direct run-in path on a direct penetration flight is the most dangerous, the pilot enters the storm from the left rear quadrant, the pilot encounters winds which are the least severe.

man and often a photographer. Each is an integral part of the group. Specific assigned tasks keep each man so occupied that he seldom has time to be frightened or even overly concerned while cataclysmic winds and rain lash the comparatively thin shell of his plane. Veteran correspondents who have made the flights compare them with operational combat missions in which the crew becomes so engrossed in its work as to be almost unaware of flak or other external dangers.

Despite the obvious hazards, many of the Hurricane Hunters are there by choice. The job is interesting and exciting, and there is a sense of accomplishment seldom equalled in peacetime operations.

The crews learn that hurricanes are as individual as people. Each has its distinctive configuration and behavior pattern. One may start from Bermuda for the Florida coast, only to veer off and be lost at sea. Another may gather speed; another may careen off the usual track and wander inland. Consequently, experience on previous missions can only be an approximate guide. The flight meteorologists, all highly trained specialists, con the aircraft into, out of and around the storms by tempering their decisions with all the knowledge they have been able to glean on any particular storm, plus whatever seems required by the exigencies of the moment.

Frequently, correspondents and commentators are carried on these flights. Doubtless if any member of the Armed Forces was genuinely interested in a closer view of this work, arrangements could be made to have him accompany a crew of Hurricane Hunters on one of their flights. If you are a believer in the "never a dull moment" philosophy, you'll probably enjoy it.

SCHOOLBOYS GO TO CAMP

MAJOR JAMES A. KLEIN

DURING the past summer, groups of teen-age high school boys could be seen marching in soldierly precision along the dusty Kansas roads leading to the rifle range, the bivouac area or the swimming pool at Fort Leavenworth. At night they stalked noiselessly through the woods on patrols.

Many of these youthful campers have elder brothers already in arms; others are intent on acquiring a basic knowledge of military life before entering the Armed Forces. All are enrolled in junior Reserve Officers Training Corps units of Kansas City, Missouri, high schools.

These cadets are participating in a summer training program sponsored jointly by ROTC instructors of Kansas City and the Commanding General of Fort Leavenworth, with the enthusiastic endorsement of the Kansas City Board of Education. The program, now in its second year, is operated at no expense to the Government except for military instructor personnel.

Two encampments, each of one week's duration, are held during the summer months. Since the high schools are closed for vacation, all boys who attend are volunteers. Each boy pays ten dollars to defray the cost of transportation, meals and bedding. In addition, he must bring three suits of underwear, three pairs of socks, two pairs of shoes (one old pair additional), a complete ROTC uniform, a pencil and a pocket notebook, one civilian shirt and a pair of trousers, a towel, washcloth, tube of tooth paste, toothbrush, soap and two handkerchiefs. As extras, he may bring cameras, swim trunks, pajamas and shaving equipment but he is definitely forbidden to have firearms, private automobiles, food, pets or alcoholic beverages. Such individual equipment as webbing and mess gear are drawn from the Fort Leavenworth quartermaster, but rifles, cleaning materials and ammunition are furnished from stocks of the professors of Military Science and Tactics. The post also provides tentage, bedding, first aid facilities and athletic equipment.

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Firing the M1 rifle on the two hundred-yard range marks the high point of the week for cadets and instructors.

U. S. Army Photograph

The encampment enables the cadet to supplement his high school ROTC training with practical instruction. In addition, he acquires a better knowledge of the obligations of citizenship while absorbing the benefit of a healthful vacation.

A model self-governing community, operating under military rules and customs, is established at the camp. The cadets are organized into a company consisting of a headquarters and three rifle platoons. The company headquarters is composed of a cadet company commander, a cadet executive officer and a cadet first sergeant. Each of the rifle platoons is made up of a platoon leader, a platoon sergeant, a guide, and four squads of eight boys each.

The senior Army officer present is designated as camp commander and is responsible for administration, training, discipline and morale. He prescribes camp policy and co-ordinates duties of Army personnel and cadet commanders.

Regular Army noncommissioned officers closely supervise cadet leaders and the training of the other cadets. In addition, the Regular Army enlisted instructors carry out essential activities normally performed by Provost Marshal, Transportation and Special Services officers.

Throughout the program the development of leadership is stressed. Responsibility is placed directly in the cadets' hands. Army personnel merely advise and supervise the cadet leaders.

Security of the camp area is maintained by the cadets themselves. Informal guard mount is held each afternoon. Participating are one cadet Officer of the Day, a cadet sergeant of the guard, three cadet corporals of the guard and twelve sentinels. The guard is so arranged that it does not interfere with the training schedule. One ROTC cadet officer normally accompanies the post's Military Police on patrol.

Rations prepared in the post's consolidated mess are trucked to the bivouac area three times a day. Three ROTC cadets act as the daily KP detail and assist in the serving of the meals. Cadets pay thirty cents for breakfast, forty-five cents for lunch and for supper.

The cadets follow a normal unit training schedule in camp. Upon arrival, they are issued equipment and given assignments within the unit. After lunch, an orientation on the do's and don'ts of camp life is given by the camp commander. Afterward ROTC instructors deliver lectures on personal hygiene, interior guard duty, range procedures and safety measures.

Two days are spent on the range firing the M1 rifle. The

majority of the cadets have never fired a weapon before. Some are nonchalant; others are apparently frightened by this unfamiliar object in their hands. Noncommissioned officers go up and down the line giving a word of encouragement or a pat on the back to a few and passing on a joke to others.

Each rifleman is assigned a cadet coach who has been instructed on how to help the man firing and what safety precautions to observe. Other cadets are in the pits ready to operate the targets. The camp commander mounts the tower. Speaking over the public address system, he gives a brief review of previous marksmanship training. His voice is firm and calm. The boys begin to relax. Knees stop shaking. The rifles are zeroed in on the targets. The calm voice tells them they are firing for record and will begin firing from a prone position.

The cadets stand up, waiting for the command. Finally it comes. "Lock, one round, load. Ready on the right? Ready on the left? Ready on the firing line!" Targets come up; and down go the cadets into firing position. Rifles crack. Dust rises from the top of the pits. The calm voice says, "Raise your fire, number twenty." "Trigger squeeze, number three."

One of the boys fails to fire and the noncommissioned instructor discovers that the young rifleman cannot reach the



Competition is keen among the ROTC cadets as marksmanship scores are tallied and compared.

U. S. Army Photograph

trigger. His arms are too short. After the rifle is placed under his armpit, he begins scoring hits. Now the targets disappear and the firing ceases.

The group seems happy but quiet as they anxiously await the targets to appear for scoring. The score-books come out and everyone watches the marking disks. As the cadets rush back of the line to turn in their scores, everyone is talking at once, comparing scores, making excuses as to why their scores are not higher. By now their fears have been overcome and they have something to show for their efforts.

Another day the cadets are given instruction in map reading and use of the compass. They are also given a review on small unit tactics. The same night they start out on a tactical problem—the seizing of a heavily defended hill. Quietly they move through the underbrush in a skirmish line. Scouts are in the lead reconnoitering the terrain. As soon as the scouts sight the enemy, they relay word to the cadet commander.

The teen-age commander hurriedly moves forward to join the advance scout and slowly reconnoiters the area. He makes an estimate of the situation and calls for his platoon leaders. After a briefing on the situation, he gives assignments to the platoon leaders who pass on instructions to the squad leaders.

While one platoon pins down the enemy with fire power, the second platoon makes a flanking attack and carries the objective. The entire maneuver has taken approximately three hours. After the company has reassembled, a final critique is given by a noncommissioned instructor.

The final day is devoted to inspection and turn-in of equipment and by mid-afternoon the camp is closed. But the knowledge gleaned during the week's encampment lives on in the vivid recollections of the youngsters, at home and in school. ROTC instruction now takes on new meaning; the generalized classroom principles of small unit tactics, map and compass reading, camouflage and concealment now become real and practical. Those approaching draft age feel added self-assurance born of familiarity with Army ways. The Army, too, has acquired new friends and advocates; and the Nation has gained another group of young enthusiasts convinced of the soundness of a field program to support classroom study.

PUBLIC INFORMATION SUPPORTS A MISSION

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CARL H. SCHOFIELD

WHEN an infantry regiment meets an obstacle, the usual procedure is to call on the artillery in direct support for a concentration of high explosives to soften up the objective.

In the more intangible realm of community relations, commanders have available a comparable—although admittedly constructive rather than destructive—agency to perform the same general function. That is the Public Information Officer and his assistants.

Such a community relations campaign was recently conducted by the Public Information Section of Exercise Pine Ridge. The fact that the projected exercise was called off has no bearing on the obstacles that were met and overcome by a judicious use of public information techniques. Actually the problems involved, and the means of solving them, are the same as those continually facing commanders at every echelon.

Exercise Pine Ridge was planned as a mountain training exercise to be held in August and September 1952 in West Virginia. Even at the initial planning stage it ran head-on into a major public relations problem—how to secure trespass permits covering many tracts of privately owned land that would have to be crossed to reach the training areas. Many of the owners of those tracts had unpleasant memories of some four hundred thousand troops training in the same location during World War II. Some remembered rather bitterly that their land had been condemned by the Government; others who had freely given trespass permits were still reporting that their cattle were stumbling into unfilled foxholes.

A Corps of Engineers real estate team spent several weeks trudging through the back country east of Elkins, West Virginia, then sent out hundreds of letters to key landowners. The response at first was poor; only about 5 percent replied.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CARL H. SCHOFIELD, Infantry, served as Public Information Officer for Exercise Pine Ridge.

By the end of April the Engineers called on the equivalent of the support battalion—that is, the problem was turned over to the Public Information Section of the Maneuver Director's Headquarters. The Section brought into action a carefully planned program which had been prepared in anticipation of just such an eventuality.

As early as March 1952, the Public Information Officer and an assistant serving with the initial planning group from Maneuver Headquarters had begun visiting newspapers and radio stations in the area to acquaint editors and managers with the scope of the entire maneuver. A meeting was held in Elkins to orient the mayor and townspeople concerning the Army's mission. Similar meetings with editors and key townspeople were staged in Buckhannon, Parsons, Franklin, Petersburg, Clarksburg and even in Charleston, one hundred and sixty miles away.

To every editor and station manager the story was relayed. Pine Ridge was to be a mountain training maneuver involving about twenty-two thousand men. It was to be held in the same training areas used during World War II. The help of press and radio was essential to the success of the maneuver. Without radio, some remote areas could never be informed.

In short, the press was told the entire story. It was stated candidly that ticklish problems might arise and that the Army was doing everything in its power to avoid such problems, but no attempt would be made to suppress unfavorable news.

Stories concerning Exercise Pine Ridge appeared in the papers. Fifteen-minute radio programs featuring personnel of Maneuver Headquarters were broadcast over local stations in Elkins and Clarksburg.

Upon return to Fort Meade headquarters, the Maneuver Chief of Staff and the Public Information Officer sent personal thank-you letters to the many individuals who offered essential cooperation. Thus, when the Engineers sent for public information help in the land procurement problem, half the battle was already won. An officer and a noncommissioned officer were sent immediately to Elkins. For three days they wrote and placed stories and radio spot announcements bearing on the particular problem. Their campaign was aimed at securing the residents' consent to give to the Army the needed rights of way.

The public was given a complete recital of the facts in order to avoid any misconceptions that might have blocked the desired action. It was stressed that the land was vital to the defense effort, that those who gave the needed permission to utilize their

land were performing a patriotic service. The Army, it was emphasized, would make on-the-spot repairs of damages.

Further emphasis was placed on the fact that in signing the yellow card which had already been mailed by the Engineers, landowners were only giving the Army permission to cross or camp briefly on their land and to use their water. This was not a contract, and anyone was entitled to change his mind.

At the same time, stories and radio announcements praised residents of the area for their past co-operation and thanked them in advance for their awareness of defense needs which prompted them to grant their permission.

By the end of April the stories and radio announcements began to appear in local papers and to be heard over nearby radio stations. Public officials were interviewed and gave encouragement over the air. When it was learned that residents in Pendleton, a key maneuver county, had difficulty in receiving one of the local radio stations which had been generous in giving time for spot announcements, a trip was made to Harrisonburg, Virginia, which originally was not considered because it was distant from the area. There too the public information team met with cordial acceptance and soon spot announcements were being aired with a distinct Pendleton County angle.

Rights to eighty percent of Priority One area and similar percentages of four other priority areas was the minimum required for the maneuver. On 8 May the Engineers reported that permits covering 30 percent of Priority One area had been acquired. Through the combined efforts of the public information program and house-to-house contacts by the Engineer representatives, maneuver rights obtained jumped to 50 percent on 9 May. By 19 May, when the maneuver was cancelled, 90 percent of the needed acreage had been acquired.

The fact that the maneuver was subsequently cancelled does not alter the fact of the success of the public information techniques. The Public Information Office performed its mission of giving support where and as needed. The conclusion is evident—commanders of any operation facing similar problems can find support from a properly planned and applied public information program.


Fort Sumter

On 12 April 1861 the opening conflict between the Union and the Confederacy was heralded by the roar of artillery in the Charleston, South Carolina, harbor. Fort Sumter stood at the entrance to the harbor opposite Fort Johnson which had already been seized by the authorities of South Carolina—the first state to secede from the Union. The surrender of Fort Sumter had been demanded and refused, even as President Lincoln was readying an expedition from New York for its relief. On 11 April, General P.G.T. Beauregard, acting upon instructions from his government, demanded the evacuation of the fort by Union forces. Major Robert Anderson, commander of the skeleton garrison of sixty-five men, refused. At 0430 the next morning Forts Johnson and Moultrie and the batteries on Morris and Sullivan's Islands opened fire.

Recounting the action later, Captain Abner Doubleday, one of Major Anderson's officers, wrote, "We have not been in the habit of regarding the signal shell fired from Fort Johnson as the first gun of the conflict, although it was undoubtedly aimed at Fort Sumter. Edmund Ruffin of Virginia is usually credited with opening the attack by firing the first gun from the iron-clad battery on Morris Island. The ball from that gun struck the wall of the magazine where I was lying, penetrated the masonry and burst very near my head."

The bombardment lasted through thirty-four hours, without casualties but with great damage by fire to the inflammable structures within the fort. Nearly all of Sumter's ammunition had been exhausted by the evening of the 13th. At 1900 terms of surrender were agreed upon. Major Anderson's handful of Union troops marched from the ruined fort the next day, saluting the Stars and Stripes with a volley of fifty guns.

The scene on the back cover depicting the interior of Fort Sumter during the engagement is from a Currier and Ives print now in the Library of Congress.



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